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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of the reduction in S02 emissions by electric utilities
between 1985 and 1993. We find that emissions have been reduced for reasons largely
unrelated to the emission reduction mandate incorporated in Title IV of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments. The principal reason appears to be the change in the economics of
coal choice that has resulted from the remarkable decline in rail rates for low sulfur
western coal delivered to higher sulfur coal-fired plants in the Midwest. We conclude that
allowance prices are lower than expected because less sulfur must be removed to meet the
Title IV caps on aggregate S02 emissions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The low price of allowances has been a frequently noted feature of the implementation of
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.2 This legislation imposed a 50% reduction of
acid rain precursor emissions, primarily sulfur dioxide (S02), by what is the largest public policy
experiment in the use of fully tradable emission permits.3 These permits are called allowances,
and they convey the right to emit one ton of SO02 in the year of issuance or any subsequent year.
In theory, the price of allowances should reflect the marginal cost of compliance. Early studies of
compliance cost generally estimated the marginal cost of compliance or allowance prices at
$300/ton to $500/ton, although it was easy to find even higher estimates. 4 Some early bilateral
allowance trades were reported at prices within this range; however, the first annual auction, in
March 1993, cleared at a price of $131. At the time, this price was viewed as too low; but two
subsequent auctions and the development of a sizeable bilateral market for allowances continue to
indicate a price for allowances at or below this figure.5
Since 1993, several observers have provided analyses of various features of Title IV and
of emissions trading that could explain the lower than expected price for allowances, namely, the
1 Ellerman is Senior Lecturer at the Sloan School of Management and Executive Director of the Center for Energy
and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). Montero is a doctoral candidate in the Technology and Policy
Program. This research is funded by a grant from the National Acidic Precipitation Assessment Program of the US
Government. Montero also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Catholic University of Chile. We are
indebted to Larry Montgomery at EPA's Acid Rain Division for invaluable help with the database, to Elizabeth M.
Bailey and Richard Schmalensee for helpful comments and discussions as this work has progressed, and to
participants in the Environmental Policy Seminar at Harvard University and the CEEPR Energy and Environmental
Policy Workshop at MIT for comments and encouragement in response to earlier presentations of this analysis.
2 Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 mandated a limit on aggregate S02 emissions of 8.95 million
tons that is to be achieved in two phases. Phase I became effective in 1995 and Phase II begins in year 2000. For a
complete description of Title IV and the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments see Locke and Harkawik (1991) and Rico
(1995).
3 For a detailed description on the theory and practice of emissions trading programs, see Montgomery (1972),
Tietenberg (1985) and Hahn and Hester (1989).
4 See Hahn and May (1995, Table 3), GAO (1994, p. 36) and EPRI (1993) for estimates of allowance prices.
5 Most recently, in January 1996, the Cantor Fitzgerald Market Price Index was $95.38.
auction rules (Cason, 1993 and 1995), the regulatory environment (GAO, 1994; Winebrake et al.,
1995), transaction costs (Stavins, 1995), and unspecified market imperfections (Wald, 1995).
This paper however, advances a different explanation: allowance prices are lower than expected
because the reduction in S02 emissions imposed by Title IV is lower than expected.
We emphasize the words "reduction" and "imposed" to stress that the cost associated
with any quantitative limit on aggregate emissions, such as that mandated by Title IV, depends
on the difference from a counter-factual. The effectively constrained reduction in emissions must
be measured from what would have occurred absent the cap, not from some earlier year. Thus, if
the estimate of the counter-factual is too high, then the estimate of the cost associated with any
given cap will be too high, and vice versa. In this paper, we conduct an analysis of S02 emissions
between 1985 and 1993 and conclude that, contrary to expectation, SO02 emissions have declined
mostly for reasons that are independent of Title IV.6 As a result, the emission constraint
imposed by Title IV is less binding, and the marginal cost of compliance, as well as the price of
allowances, will be lower.7
The next section of the paper presents a comparison of actual S02 emissions through
1993 with several representative forecasts of what emissions were expected to be absent Title IV.
Section III provides a brief discussion of the underlying economics of coal choice as it pertains to
coals of differing sulfur content. Section IV presents an econometric analysis of the emissions
data base at the level of the generating unit to test various hypotheses that might explain the
observed reduction in S02 emissions. The final section presents conclusions.
H. FORECAST AND ACTUAL SO02 EMISSIONS
During the debate on acid rain legislation during the 1980s, S02 emissions were typically
projected to rise throughout the 1990s as a result of the continuing increase in the demand for and
generation of electricity. Accordingly, the emission reduction to be achieved as a result of Title
IV was expected to be greater than what would be implied by a comparison of the Phase I or
Phase II tonnage caps with 1985 emissions. Figure 1 compares actual aggregate S02 emissions
from electric utilities with several representative projections of the same emissions absent Title
IV. In fact, emissions have declined steadily from 1989 through 1993.8 Table 1 provides aggregate
summary data on emissions, heat input and other variables for 1985 and the years 1988 through
6 The analysis could be performed with any year after 1990. We use 1985 as our beginning year because it is a
frequent benchmark and it is associated with the baseline for the Title IV allocation of allowances. The year 1993
was the latest year for which complete unit level emissions data existed at the time of our analysis.
7 Some authors (e.g. Burtraw, 1995) have also argued that Title IV has had an indirect effect on early S02
emissions reduction by promoting competition in input markets (low sulfur coal and railroad) and technological
change. Measuring the magnitude of such an effect is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 In Figure 1, the significant difference in the more recent EPA and EPRI studies between actual 1993 levels and the
projected 1995 projections reflects an implicit assumption that 1993 levels are already affected by Title IV.
1993 for all units9 and two partitions of the complete set of fossil generating units: by
designation for control in Phase I (Table A) and by fuel type. 10 Table 1 shows that the 1.2
million ton reduction in SO02 emissions between 1985 and 1993 has occurred mostly at Table A
units and at coal-fired units, and that the reduction is due to a decline in the average emission rate
at these units, not reduced utilization. For instance, between 1985 and 1993, aggregate S02
emissions from coal-fired plants had declined by 7.5% despite a 15.4% increase in heat input at
these same plants. In effect, the national average emission rate at coal-fired power plants
declined by 20% over these years.
Several explanations can be offered for the observed reduction in SO02 emissions. The
most obvious is that, even though the Title IV limit is not effective until 1995, Table A units are
complying early. Competitive firms would not be expected to incur the higher costs implied by
early compliance; however, where the additional cost of the lower sulfur coal or the retrofit can
be passed through to consumers subject to regulatory approval, such early compliance remains a
possibility. Indeed, various studies of compliance plans suggest that utilities are taking actions to
reduce emissions well-ahead of the time when the reduction requirement becomes binding. 11
A second reason for the observed reduction is that several states have enacted state laws
or amended State Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the pre-1990 Clean Air Act to require
reductions in S02 emissions by 1993. These changes in state law and regulation have been limited
to only a few states, but their effect would account for some of the reduction in emissions
observed as of 1993.
Yet a third explanation is suggested by the pronounced geographic concentration of the
emission reduction, as shown by Figure 2 which distributes the reduction in aggregate tonnage by
100 mile bands from the source of the cheapest and lowest sulfur coal in America. Virtually all
(99.5%) of the 1.2 million ton reduction of S02 emissions at coal plants between 1985 and 1993
is achieved at units lying within the 600 to 1000 mile bands. The plants lying within this zone
correspond to the area that would be most affected by the significant reduction of rail rates for
hauling low-sulfur western coal as a result of railroad deregulation. Thus, a third explanation is
that lower sulfur western coals have become cheaper than the predominantly higher sulfur
midwestern coals previously consumed in this area, and that utilities are switching to lower sulfur
coals for economic reasons independently of Title IV.12
9 A unit, which is defined as a "fossil-fuel-fired combustion device" in § 402 of the CAA, corresponds to a single
generator and associated boiler. A generating plant can house one or several units, which may be of different sizes,
vintages, type or fuel input.
10 The 263 units affected in Phase I were designated in the legislation by a Table A, and with a few exceptions,
Table A included all fossil-fuel fired units of 100 MWe capacity or greater with an average S02 emission rate in
1985 above 2.5 lbs of S02 per mmBtu (hereafter #/mmBtu). Phase II applies to all fossil-fuel fired units beginning
with the year 2000, and, in general, further limits emissions to the lower of 1.2 #/mmBtu or the 1985 emission rate
times baseline heat input.
11 For details on compliance plans see Fieldston (1994), EIA (1994b), and EPRI (1993).
12 See Clean Air Compliance Review (May 8, 1995) for a similar argument.
Finally, there are other influences that operate to reduce sulfur emissions over the long
term. Many of these factors were operative during the ten years prior to 1985 when aggregate
sulfur emissions also declined despite rising coal use.13 Under the existing Clean Air Act, any
new generating unit is tightly controlled to new source performance standards, and typically such
units displace power from older and higher sulfur sources. Similarly, the general shift of economic
activity to the South and the West away from the Midwest transfers electricity demand from
higher sulfur generating sources to lower sulfur sources. Finally, competition among coal
suppliers has led to the virtual elimination of raw (unwashed) coal and the general upgrading of
the delivered product that typically entails the removal of some of the pyrite sulfur fraction.
These underlying trends may have abated in the 1990s, but they are likely still present and
account for some of the observed reduction.
Before proceeding with our analysis, we make a brief digression concerning the underlying
factors influencing an electric utility's choice among coals of differing sulfur content.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF COAL CHOICE
Coal is a bulky form of energy for which transportation costs will always figure
importantly in the delivered price. The importance of transportation costs implies that the
choice of the least cost coal at any given location will often depend more on the distance to
competing mines than on the premium attached to particular attributes such as low sulfur
content. Furthermore, it is a peculiar feature of the American coal economy that the lowest cost
coal at the mine has the lowest sulfur content, but is located' farthest from the principal markets.
Due to extraordinary geological conditions, energy from coal is available in the Powder River
Basin (PRB) in northeastern Wyoming at $0.20 to $0.25 mmBtu, or the crude oil equivalent of
$1.20 to $1.50/bbl. Emissions of S02 from PRB coals range from 0.5 lbs of SO02 per mmBtu
(hereafter #/mmBtu) to 1.2 #/mmBtu. The combination of low production cost and low sulfur
content is not matched in any other coal producing region, but the two principal competing
regions, the Midwest and Appalachia, enjoy much greater proximity to markets, particularly, the
coal-fired units between the Mississippi and the Appalachian mountains, where most Phase I
units are located. Appalachian and midwestern coal producers have historically enjoyed the
advantage of the locational rents created by the substantial cost of transporting PRB coal to
markets east of the Mississippi, typically two-thirds to three-quarters of the delivered price.
Since most coal is carried to market by rail, the deregulation of railroads during the 1980s
has affected the economics of coal choice. Two effects are particularly important. First,
significant cost-reducing and productivity-enhancing improvements have been achieved (EIA,
1991). Second, the implementing legislation, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, effectively introduced
competition in the carriage of coal out of the PRB. 14 The consequence has been a reduction of the
13 See National Coal Association (1987) for a discussion of these factors.
14 As noted by Sharp (1991), competition on low-sulfur coal rail routes is becoming more intense. The Staggers
Act ended the Burlington Northern Railroad's monopoly of the PRB by removing various obstacles to the Chicago
and North Western spur which connected the PRB to the Union Pacific Railroad.
rail rate from over two cents per ton-mile in the early to mid 1980s to less than a penny a ton-
mile today. This change in transportation cost reduced the price of PRB coal delivered to
midwestern locations significantly, pushed the frontier of western coal further east, and
concomitantly reduced the locational advantage enjoyed by midwestern and appalachian coals in
the market between the Mississippi and Appalachia. For instance, the average rate per ton for
contract coal rail shipments from the PRB to the Midwest has declined by 35 % from 1988 to
1993, while the reduction in per ton rail rates for central appalachian and midwestern coals has
been 19% and 32%, respectively (EIA, 1995, esp. Tables 12 and 16). Given the share of
transportation cost in the delivered price of these competing coals at midwestern locations, the
percentage change in delivered price has been even greater.
As transportation costs have declined, the improving position of PRB coals in the
Midwest has been masked by the presence of long term supply contracts. These contracts have
been a prominent, albeit diminishing, feature of coal markets; and, although every contract is
different, there are some broad generalities that are applicable.15 In the 1970s, when electricity
growth seemed assured and coal increasingly became the only attractive fuel, many electric
utilities signed long-term coal supply contracts for terms typically of 20 years, but often as much
as forty years duration. These contracts effectively dedicated particular coal reserves to the
service of the contracting utility at prices which were then considered favorable. As coal prices
declined continuously during the 1980s, the divergence of contract and market price caused the
pricing provisions of these contracts to become the subject of intense renegotiation, buy-out,
litigation and various types of breach. The contracts were usually maintained in some form, and
although the pricing provisions might be amended, the coal contracted for and the associated
sulfur attributes continued to be supplied to the buyer's generating units. The effect of long term
contracts has been to delay the switching to and blending with PRB coals in the Midwest.
Nevertheless, as the contracts expired, were bought out or otherwise terminated, electric utilities
have been able to switch to these lower cost coals. 16
IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
4.1 The Data
The aggregate data discussed in Section II contain three prominent features which suggest
two explanations for the observed reduction in SO02 emissions. The first prominent feature is that
the 1.2 million ton reduction in S02 emissions observed between 1985 and 1993 occurs entirely
in Table A units and in coal-fired units. Secondly, the reduction of emissions at Table A and at
coal-fired units is due to lower emission rates, not less utilization. The third feature is the
geographic concentration of the reduction in a zone extending from 600 to 1000 miles from the
PRB. Early compliance with the emission reduction mandate of Title IV is an obvious
15 Joskow (1985 and 1987) provides a complete analysis of how long-term coal contracts differ among electric
utilities and coal mines.
16 Switching to low sulfur coal can be confirmed with EIA's (1994a and 1994b) reports.
explanation given the observed reduction in emission rates at Table A units. Yet, the geographical
concentration of the emission reduction indicates that location is also important, and suggests
that the contemporaneous decline in coal-hauling rail rates may be an important factor.
The aggregate data do not permit us to discriminate between these explanations or others,
if for no other reason that changes in the utilization of individual units are not taken into account.
For instance, the greater utilization of lower emission units would show up as a lower aggregate
emission rate without any reduction in emission rates at individual units. Similarly, given the
geographic concentration of Table A units in the Midwest relative to non-Table A units, a switch
to lower sulfur PRB coals by midwestern utilities because of cheaper rail rates would result in a
larger reduction in the aggregate emission rate for Table A units, even though the reason had
nothing to do with Title IV.
We perform our analysis with a unit-specific data base (Pechan, 1995) provided by EPA's
Acid Rain Division that contains information on about 3000 units, most of which are subject to
the Title IV SO02 emission restrictions either in Phase I or Phase 11.17 In addition to identifying
information concerning boiler number, location, ownership, nameplate capacity and predominant
fuel use, this data base provides unit specific data concerning heat input and SO02 emissions for
1985 and the years 1988 through 1993, as shown in Table 1.
For our analysis, we select only those units that are affected by Title IV in either Phase I
or II and that use coal as the primary fuel. 18 Since we are interested in the change of emission
rates between 1985 and 1993, we further eliminate all those units with zero emissions in either
1985 or 1993. Although this last truncation of the sample eliminates some new units and units
that may have been retired, it removes the effect of units which were active but, for maintenance
or other reasons, were not generating electricity in either 1985 or 1993. In the end, our sample
consists of 1043 units that account for 97% of S02 emissions, 77% of heat input, and 57% of
capacity in 1985. As shown in Table 2, our sample includes 251 Table A and 792 Non-Table A
units. 19
4.2 The Model
Two hypotheses can be advanced to explain the observed reduction in S02 emissions.
The first is early compliance: utilities are taking actions to reduce emissions at Table A units in
advance of the mandated 1995 reduction. The second hypothesis is that electric utilities are
switching to low sulfur coals to take advantage of lower delivered prices, primarily because of
lower rail rates. A critical difference, assuming cost minimizing behavior by electric utilities, as
17 Detailed description of all variables and observations in the data base can be found in Pechan (1993).
18 The primary fuel is defined as heat input greater than 50 percent of the total in the baseline period of 1985-87.
19 The number of 'Table A units is reduced from the 263 named in the legislation to the 251 used in this sample by
the deletion of 6 coal units that were retired by 1993 and 6 oil-fired units. Similarly, the sample does not include
374 coal-fired units that are either too small to be subject to Title IV, unutilized, new or retired. These 374 units
account for only 2 % of 1985 heat input and SO02 emissions at coal-fired units.
we do, is that the first hypothesis implies additional cost for the observed emission reduction
because of Title IV, while the second does not. To the extent the first hypothesis is correct, we
would not expect to find similarly located non-Table A units effecting the same emission
reductions. Conversely, to the extent the second hypothesis is true, we would expect to find
more geographical differentiation and little distinction between Table A and non-Table A units. In
addition, state-imposed limits and other factors could explain part of the observed reduction in
S02 emissions.
To test our hypotheses and disentangle the effect of the different factors, we use a simple
linear specification that relates unit-specific emission rates in 1993 to the 1985 rates with
abundant use of dummy or categorical variables. We focus on emission rates, rather than tons of
S02 emitted, to normalize for heat input. Our equation for the it unit is:
RTE93, = A + ARlTE85, + f 2TA, + a TAR + f 4DO_6 + fl5D6_8, + f 6D8 10,
+f 7D1 0_12, + flD12_13, + ( 9STA TELIM, + AOLCOAL
+A,SCRUB93, + ,2PHISCR, + A3DATAERR? + f 4DIR TY, + u, (1)
where
RTE93 S02 emission rate in 1993 (in #/mmBtu)
RTE85 S02 emission rate in 1985 (in #/mmBtu)
TA dummy equal to one for all Table A units
TAR TA multiplied by RTE85
DO_6 dummy variable equal to one for units located within 0-600 miles of the PRB
D6_8 dummy variable equal to one for units located within 600-800 miles of the PRB
D8_10 dummy variable equal to one for units located within 800-1000 miles of the PRB
D10 12 dummy variable equal to one for units located within 1000-1200 miles of the PRB
D12_13 dummy variable equal to one for units located within 1200-1300 miles of the PRB
STATELIM .dummy variable equal to one if the unit is subject to S02 limits imposed since
1985 by state laws or regulations other than Title IV
LCOAL dummy variable equal to one for Table A units located in states that adopted local
coal protection provisions after 1990
SCRUB93 dummy variable equal to one if the unit has installed scrubbers in 1993 or before
(these are all Table A units)
PHISCR dummy variable equal to one if the unit is planning to install scrubbers in 1994 or
later to comply with Phase I requirements (these are all Table A units as well)
DATAERR dummy variable equal to one for a sub-set of units that likely involve a data error
in that these units were scrubbed in 1985 but show 1993 emissions that suggest
unscrubbed coal
DIRTY dummy variable equal to one for four units that are extreme outliers in that they
were burning very high sulfur coal in 1985 and very low sulfur coal soon thereafter
u error term.
The number of observations in each of these categories is given atTable 3. If there were no
discernible change in unit-specific emission rates between 1985 and 1993, all coefficients would
be zero except for fI,, the coefficient on RTE85, which would take the value of unity.
Our specification imposes a common slope coefficients for Table A and non-Table A
units across all categories and adds three sub-sets of dummy variables. The first set of dummy
variables, TA and TAR, is used to test for early compliance and indicates the additional effect that
is associated with designation as a Table A unit. A dummy variable for the slope coefficient is
introduced for Table A, but not for the other categories, because the emission rate is the primary
determinant of whether a unit is listed in Table A and we want to allow, for any interaction
between intercept and slope coefficients. If the hypothesis of early compliance is correct, the
two coefficients will jointly predict a lower emission rate for the Table A units.
To test for our second hypothesis, that declining rail rates have reduced emission rates,
we use a second set of categorical variables which control for location in relation to the PRB. The
17 100-mile -zones shown in Figure 2 were combined into 6 by the use of F-tests to determine
which. 100-mile bands were sufficiently alike that they. could be pooled into wider zones without
loss of statistical power. Since our dummy variables are additive, the 5 distance zones closest to
the PRB are represented by dummy variables and the equation intercept applies to the sixth
zone, that farthest from the PRB, which is also the zone containing the largest number of
generating units. Figure 3 indicates the location of the PRB, Table A units, and the six zones that
remain after pooling. In contrast to the treatment of Table A variables, we do not include slope
dummies, since there is little correlation between the 1985 emission rates and distance from the
PRB (p = .087). If declining rail rates have caused utilities to switch td PRB coals in the area
between the Mississippi and the Appalachians between 1985 and 1993, the corresponding
distance coefficients will be significantly different from zero and negative, and when tested
jointly, the distance dummies will show statistical significance.
We have used pooled categorical variables to test for the effect of declining rail rates
instead of a single continuous variable for two reasons. First and most importantly, our a priori
expectation is that distance will not affect coal choice uniformly but discontinuously. For
locations closest to and farthest away from the PRB, declining rail rates will have little effect on
coal choice. For close locations, the low mine-mouth price of PRB coal would cause it to have
been chosen over competing coals in 1985, regardless of the ton/mile rate. For far locations, the
delivered price in 1993 would still be too high to compete with eastern coals. The principal effect
of lower rail rates will be felt in some intermediate region in which PRB coals will have become
newly competitive. As suggested by Figure 2, this intermediate zone lies between 600 and 1000
miles from the PRB. The second reason for the use of dummy variables instead of a single
continuous variable is that rail transport cost is not strictly linear in distance, particularly as the
crow flies which is how we have measured it.20 For any significant distance, coal transport can be
economically performed only by rail or waterway and each mode is limited to existing networks
which do not extend in all directions as the crow flies. Furthermore, any change of rail line or
20 To be exact, from the geographic center of the county in which the generating unit is located to Gillette,
Wyoming, the principal town in the Powder River Basin.
shipment mode incurs additional handling charges. Thus, it is quite possible for two points
geographically equidistant from the PRB to face different rail rates. Our use of pooled
discontinuous variables is also an attempt to capture these departures from strict linearity.
Finally, given the size of the sample, there is little sacrifice in degrees of freedom by adding five
discontinuous dummies instead of one continuous variable.
The third set of categorical variables, STA TELIM, LCOAL, SCRUB93, PHISCR,
DATAERR and DIRTY, account for causes other than our basic two hypotheses and for data
anomalies. Three states, Wisconsin, Minnesota and New Hampshire had enacted acid rain laws
or taken regulatory actions to reduce S02 emissions that were in effect by 1993;21 and the 61
coal-fired units affected by these actions are indicated by STATELIM. Next, five states,
Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania, have enacted legislation or taken other
measures to alleviate the impact of Title IV on the local high sulfur coal industry. 22 Since these
actions operate through the state review of compliance plans, we limit the dummy LCOAL to the
134 Table A units located in these states.23 We expect coefficients for STA TELIM and LCOAL to
be negative and positive, respectively.
Three Table A units had already installed scrubbers by 1993 as part of the DOE's Clean
Coal Technology Program, and are designated by SCRUB93,24 and our expectation is that these
coefficients will be negative. The possible effect of annouriced intentions to install scrubbers for
Phase I compliance at an additional 24 units is represented by the dummy PHISCR.25 These
scrubbers were not in place in 1993, but utilities that are planning to install scrubbers would not
be switching to lower sulfur coals. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient for this variable to be
positive.
Dummy variables are also used to isolate some peculiar data observations. Figure 4 shows
the plot of all the data points for our regression against the 450 line and indicates (with a box and
circle) the observations set apart by the last two dummy variables. The variable DATAERR
designates nine units with scrubbers that had relatively low emission rates in 1985, but for which
the 1993 emissions, as reported in the database, would be typically associated with non-scrubbed
21 Other states had enacted acid rain laws or regulations, e.g. 1New York and Massachusetts, but they had not taken
effect by 1993.
22 Various issues of Clean Air Compliance Review (previously Compliance Strategy Review) provide details on
these matters (see Jan 15, 1996; Sep 25, 1995; May 8, 1995; April 10, 1995; Jan 16, 1995; Sep 12, 1994; Aug 29,
1994; Jan 17, 1994; and Jan 3, 1994).
23 It is worth mentioning, that in Illinois and Indiana these statutes has been ruled unconstitutional after 1993
under the. Interstate Commerce Clause, and that in Ohio they are waiting for final ruling. No challenges to local coal
provisions have been taken in Pennsylvania and Kentucky.
24 These units are Yates #1 and Bailly #7 and #8 (Fieldston, 1994).
25 These units are identified based upon review of compliance intentions contained in Fieldston (1994) and EPRI
(1993 and 1995).
units.26 It is possible that the scrubbers were not operating in 1993, but we are also advised that
the 1985 data were subjected to a much higher degree of quality control than other years since
emission allocations were, often dependent on 1985 emission rates. 27 In any case, the
observations are anomalous and we control for them separately.
Our final dummy variable, DIRTY, is associated with 4 old mine-mouth units in Missouri
which are distinct outliers in that they burned higher sulfur coal than any other unit in 1985, but
were among the lowest emitters in 1993.28 Their circumstance reflects geographic and historical
coincidence that the coal producing region closest to the PRB from the east (excluding North
Dakota lignites) produces the highest sulfur coal in America. 29 All four were designated as Table
A units despite having switched by the time Title IV was enacted; and unless isolated by this
dummy, their inclusion in the sample significantly influences the Table A coefficients. Although
the isolation of such outliers is always problematic, no other Table A units in Missouri, Kansas
or Iowa made such a dramatic switch in sulfur content prior to enactment of Title IV (or for that
matter, afterwards).
Before turning to the econometriC results, we note that we have not addressed the effect
oflong-term contracts. Their effect is to delay any switch to another coal that might be justified
for economic or other reasons. Although we believe that the inclusion of an appropriate variable
for contracts would improve the explanatory power of the regression, we do not expect the
omission of this variable to have a pronounced effect on the relative importance of early
compliance and declining rail rates. The existence of a long term contract would delay switching
to a lower sulfur coal equally whether the reason was early compliance or lower cost.30
4.3 Econometric Results
4.3.1 The Basic Linear Model
Results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (1) are presented in
Table 4. The basic intercept and slope coefficients are significantly different than the values of
zero and unity, respectively, which they would take if there were no discernible change from unit
emission rates in 1985. With an adjusted R2 of .80, the equation does a good job in explaining the
26 Indeed, for those units which are co-located with non-scrubbed units, the emission rates reported for 1993 are
similar to those reported for the non-scrubbed units.
27 Personal communication from Larry Montgomery, Acid Rain Division, Environmental Protection Agency.
28 Three units at the Montrose plant switched to PRB coal prior to 1988 and the remaining unit at the Asbury
plant switched to PRB coal in 1990.
29 The Missouri-Kansas seam runs roughly from the northeastern corner of Oklahoma along the Missouri-Kansas
border and into central Iowa. Most production from this seam was long ago shut down, except for some few
remaining mine-mouth and small plants.
30 In some cases, companies with PRB reserves have renegotiated contracts to substitute the lower sulfur coal for
the previously contracted local coal.
decline in emission rates at the unit level; and the t-statistics indicate that most of the estimated
coefficients are statistically significant at the 99% level. Since the relevant tests indicate non-
uniform variance in the error term, we report heteroskedastic-consistent (White) estimates of the
standard errors in Table 4 and throughout the analysis.3 1
As shown in Table 4, the coefficients for Table A fail the 99% significance level when
tested individually, but when tested jointly, as they should be, the hypothesis that Table A has
no effect upon observed emissions in 1993 is rejected. Distance from the PRB is highly
significant. When tested jointly, the five distance dummies easily exceed the 99% significance
level; and individually, all pass the 99% level. The negative coefficients for all distance bands
within 1200 miles of the PRB, with particularly large and strong effects within 1000 miles,
indicate greater reductions closer to the PRB, as would be expected with lower rail rates for PRB
coals. We do not have an explanation for the positive coefficient for the 1200-1300 mile distance
band, or equivalently, the greater reduction in the emission rate for units lying in the default
distance band (>1300 miles), but these last two zones lie beyond the current eastern frontier of
PRB coal.
The coefficients for variables other than Table A or distance have the expected signs and,
with one exception are statistically significant at a level well above 99%. The STATELIM
coefficient indicates that state-imposed limits in Wisconsin, Minnesota and New Hampshire
caused an additional 0.81 #/mmBtu reduction in the emission rate beyond what would be
otherwise expected. The LCOAL coefficient suggests that state actions to protect local coal have
resulted in 0.58#/mmBtu less of a reduction in the emission rate at these Table A units. As
expected, the three early scrubbers that are part of the DOE's Clean Coal Technology Program
show a large reduction in emission rate over what would otherwise have been expected for these
units. The PHISCR coefficient denoting the 24 units that have announced the intent to install a
scrubber for Phase I compliance, has the expected positive sign, but the effect is not statistically
discernible. 32 Finally, no particular meaning can be attached to the coefficients for the two
dummies representing anomalous observations.
When we run the regression with unit emission rates in 1990, 1991, and 1992 as the
dependent variable, we obtain the same qualitative results but with further indication of the
effects of declining rail rates and Table A. As shown in Table 4, distance from the PRB is always
significant in these years and increasingly so with each advancing year. In contrast, the Table A
coefficients do not show any statistical significance in 1996-92. These regressions suggest that
1993 is the first year in which Table A begun to make a difference in SO02 emissions.
3 1 Specifically, the White, Goldfield-Quandt and Breusch-Pagan tests all indicate heteroskedasticity at the 99%
significance level. We have attempted unsuccessfully to remove the heteroskedasticity by several transformations of
the data; hence, we rely on the OLS estimator with robust variances and the Wald test, instead of the F test, for
testing joint hypotheses.
32 Since it is often asserted that scrubbers are installed only as a result of the local coal provisions captured by the
variable LCOAL, we note that 11 of the 24 units intending to install scrubbers for Phase I compliance are not
located in these five states, and that 3 are located in states with no coal production whatsoever (New York and New
Jersey).
In summary, except for the announced intention to install a scrubber, we find that all of
the factors we expected to influence S02 emissions did so. With respect to our two hypotheses,
declining rail rates have had a far stronger effect on the reduction of emission rates observed
between 1985 and 1993 than early compliance.
4.3.2 Alternative Specifications
Table 5 shows the results of a variety of alternative specifications that we have used to
test the robustness of our results. When a quadratic form is used, in which the 1993 emission rate
is regressed on the first and second powers of the 1985 rate, Wald tests yield the same result:
distance from the PRB has a strong effect, while Table A is less significant. When the log of the
1993 rate is regressed on'the log of the 1985 rate, distance is again confirmed as highly important,
and the effect of Table A continues to be less significant.
The fact that most non-Table A units have emissions less than 2.5#/mmBtu, while there
are no Table A units with emissions below 2.5#/mmBtu in 1985, as shown in the table below,
raises the possibility that the effects of Table A and distance should be judged based on a sample
consisting only of units with a 1985 emission rate above 2.5#/mmBtu. Fortunately, we have
enough observations to run the regression on this smaller sub-sample. As Table 5 indicates, the
relative importance of Table A and distance remains the same as in the full sample. 33
RTE85 < 2.5#/mmBtu RTE85 > 2.5#/mmBtu Total
Table A 0 251 251
Non-Table A 650 142 792
Total 650 393 1043
We have already addressed our reasons for preferring a discontinuous specification of
distance from the PRB to reflect the effect of rail rates on the choice of coal, but we have also run
the regression with distance as a continuous variable. The distance variable is very significant
statistically and its value suggests that every 100 miles makes a difference of .06#/mmBtu in the
reduction of emission rates observed between 1985 and 1993. As a further indication of the
significance of rail rates in explaining changes in unit emission rates, the correlation between
distance and emission rates in 1985 and in 1993 rises from .087 to .26. When the distance variable
is continuous, the Table A dummies are no stronger than before, and are in fact somewhat
weaker. We also ran a specification in which we isolated the slightly more than 100 units located
west and south of the PRB, since PRB coals do not generally compete with higher sulfur coals in
those directions. Although we do not report them here, results concerning Table A and the
influence of distance were the same as what we obtained when no distinction was made for the
direction from the PRB.
33 Note that the standard errors are, in general, larger in the sub-sample than in the full sample.
One final issue concerning the robustness of our conclusions is the particular treatment of
the four outlier units denoted by the variable DIRTY. These Table A units exhibited the four
highest unit emission rates in 1985, but they were among the lowest in 1993. When these four
Table A units are not set apart by a dummy, the joint effect of Table A remains statistically
significant, as does distance; but the coefficients on the intercept and slope dummies for Table A
are very different from the values which are otherwise obtained. Since these units switched to
PRB coal before the enactment of Title IV, the very large reduction in the emission rates at these
units is not an instance of cost-increasing early compliance which we seek to capture by the
Table A variables. The inclusion of a dummy variable for these four units does not affect our
basic conclusion concerning the relative importance of early compliance and declining rail rates,
but it does provide better estimates for the Table A coefficients.
4.3.3. A Quantitative Summary
The relative effect of early compliance and declining rail rates on the reduction of S02
emissions between 1985 and 1993 can be quantified. Table 6 presents a decomposition of the
reduction in SO02 emissions into constituent elements as revealed by the econometric analysis
presented above. The difference presented here is that between a counter-factual and a projection
of 1993 emissions using the fitted estimates of unit emission rates. We form the counter-factual
by multiplying heat input in 1993 for each unit by the corresponding 1985 emission rate. When
summed across units, this product gives us an estimate of what aggregate S02 emissions would
have been in 1993 absent any reduction in emission rates, but allowing for the growth of demand
for electricity and for changes in the dispatch of generating units observed in 1993. Next, we
project 1993 emission rates using the results of the econometric analysis and multiply them by
1993 unit heat input to obtain the estimate of 1993 emissions. The first panel in Table 6 presents
counterfactual and estimated emissions for 1993 and actual 1985 and 1993 emissions for
reference. The second panel attributes the reduction from the counterfactual to the various causes
and locates those reductions at Table A and non-Table A units.
In Table 6, we group the effects of the Table A variables with those denoting state limits,
local coal provisions, the intended installation of scrubbers, and the Clean Coal Technology
program, as Title IV related causes. In the aggregate, these causes account for about 390,000 tons
of the reduction from the counterfactual, or 20% of the total. The other category, which we label
changing sulfur economics, accounts for the remaining 80% or about 1.66 million tons of the
reduction from the counterfactual or about 80% of the total. This seconld category can be viewed
as capturing the reduction in SO02 emissions that would have occurred without Title IV. In
relating the 2.05 million ton reduction from the counterfactual to the 1.2 million ton reduction
from 1985, we can say that changing sulfur economics have more than offset the effects of load
growth, and that Title IV related factors account for about 0.4 million tons of the observed
reduction. When compared to earlier forecasts of rising emissions absent Title IV, our analysis
indicates that those forecasts over-estimated emissions growth and the quantity of sulfur that
would be removed by Title IV.
Several features of Table 6 deserve note. First, in the five states where local coal
provisions have been adopted, these measures have offiet the tendency to early compliance that
is observed elsewhere. Second, the predicted increases of emissions for non-Table A units in the
distance zones beyond 1000 miles from the PRB reflect not only the diminished effect of the
decline in rail rates for PRB coal, but also the shift of generation to non-Table A units that is
indicated by the heat input data on Tables 1 and 2 and the smaller predicted reduction for units
with lower emission rates (non-Table A units) in all distance zones. 34 Finally, the puzzling
occurrence of the largest reductions in emissions at Table A units for reasons largely unrelated to
Title IV can be explained. Table A units are disproportionately located in the areas most affected
by declining rail rates. Table A units also have higher emission rates and larger generating
capacity, so that switching to a PRB coal has more effect on tons emitted at these units.
V. CONCLUSION
We have performed an econometric analysis of unit level SO2 emission rates at electric-
utility-owned generating plants to determine potential causes of the reduction of aggregate S02
emissions observed as of 1993, two years before Title IV becomes effective. Our analysis
indicates that, as of 1993, designation for early control by Table A has had relatively little effect
and that the largest part of the reduction in SO2 emissions since 1985 is attributable to changes in
the economics of coals of differing sulfur content.
Based on the distinct geographic pattern of observed emission reductions and the
consistently large statistical significance of distance in our regressions, we believe that the
principal cause of the change in the economics of coal choice is the reduction of rail rates out of
the Powder River Basin (PRB) which resulted from the deregulation of the railroads in the 1980s.
This development made a very low sulfur coal economically attractive in areas where local, higher
sulfur coals had previously dominated. It is a geographic coincidence, and a felicitous one, that
the market being captured by the lower delivered price of PRB coal encompasses many of the
plants designated for early control in Phase I. Switching to lower cost PRB coals has probably
been impeded by long-term contracts and the often limited ability of plants built for mid-western
bituminous coals to burn sub-bituminous coals; however, time and a surprising degree of
innovation in blending and the adaptation of existing plants has and will continue to reduce these
impediments.
Our analysis should not be interpreted as suggesting that Title IV has had no effect, much
less that compliance with Title IV will be achieved at no cost. The main point of our analysis is
that it would not be correct to attribute all of the decrease in observed emissions to Title IV.
Nevertheless, our analysis clearly implies that the cost of compliance with Title IV will be less
than it would have been based on earlier predictions of SO2 emissions in the 1990s. In economic
terms, railroad deregulation has moved the Powder River Basin closer to the Midwest. The effect
is the same as if a new low-sulfur coal province had been discovered only half as far away: the
cost of compliance will be less.
34 For all distance bands except the 600-800 mile zone, the positive intercept and a slope coefficient less than one
imply larger proportionate reductions for higher emitting units.
This implication returns us to the question posed by the title of this paper: Why are
Allowance Prices so Low? In the light of our analysis, the answer is straight-forward. Allowance
prices are lower than expected because the emission reduction imposed by Title IV is less than
had been initially anticipated. In effect, the marginal abatement cost curve has shifted downward,
such that the marginal cost of meeting the emission cap imposed by Title IV is lower. Although
the design of the annual auction may understate price and transaction costs may depress the price
of allowances, there exists a far simpler explanation for low allowance prices: there is less sulfur
to be removed.
There are several policy-related implications of this analysis. First, to the extent that our
analysis contributes to an explanation of the relatively low price of allowances to date, it
provides strong support for the market-revealing properties of auctions. In this case, it is evident
that expert and informed opinion failed to anticipate the reduction in rail rates or the effect on
coal choice. That a forecast should turn out to be off the mark is not so surprising, but the
experience here demonstrates the importance of having a market alternative that can challenge or
confirm expert opinion, especially where compliance options with long lead times require early
decisions. 35
Second, it has been maintained that low allowance prices and the alleged low volume of
trades indicate that the allowance trading is not "working" (Wald, 1995). This argument is
fallacious in that neither the price of allowances nor the volume of trading imply much about the
functioning of this market, but our analysis shows that there are good reasons for allowance
prices to be less than had been expected and that no appeal need to be made to market failure.
Finally, one cannot help but be impressed by the cumulative effect of reliance on market
mechanisms. The cost of compliance has been reduced in the Midwest by the earlier embrace of
market mechanisms in an associated industry; and the market mechanism incorporated in Title IV
will permit these cost savings to be transmitted to other regions beyond the reach of PRB coals.
It is impossible to know what would have happened to rail rates for PRB coals if the railroads
had continued to be regulated; but experience with deregulated industries suggests that we would
have experienced neither the much lower rail rates, nor the serendipitous reduction in the cost of
meeting other societal objectives.
35 We note that commitments to scrubbers were postponed after the first auction revealed that overcompliance might
not be worth $300-400 a ton of S02 removed.
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Table 1. Aggregate Powerplant data: 1985 - 1993
1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
All Units
S02 Emissions (000 tons) 16,243 15,830 15,993 15,820 15,651 15,285 15,065
Heat Input (10^12 Btu) 18,579 19,805 20,100 19,791 19,704 19,646 20,259
Emission Rate (#/mmBtu) 1.75 1.60 1.59 1.60 1.59 1.56 1.49
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 533,058
Number of Units 2918
Table A vs Non-Table A Units
Table A Units
S02 Emissions (000 tons) 9,302 8,887 8,862 8,683 8,396 8,140 7,579
Heat Input (10^12 Btu) 4,387 4,426 4,427 4,392 4,318 4,351 4,396
Emission Rate (#/mmBtu) 4.24 4.02 4.00 3.95 3.89 3.74 3.45
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 88,007
Number of Units 263
Non-Table A Units*
S02 Emissions (000 tons) 6,941 6,943 7,132 7,137 7,255 7,145 7,486
Heat Input (10^12 Btu) 14,192 15,379 15,673 15,398 15,386 15,295 15,863
Emission Rate (#/mmBtu) 0.98 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 445,051
Number of Units 2655
Coal- vs Oil/Gas-fired Units
Coal-fired Units
S02 Emissions (000 tons) 15,630 15,084 15,208 15,186 15,005 14,742 14,456
Heat Input (10^12 Btu) 14,626 15,946 16,039 16,093 16,066 16,224 16,876
Emission Rate (#/mmBtu) 2.14 1.89 1.90 1.89 1.87 1.82 1.71
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 347,271
Number of Units 1417
Oil/Gas-fired Units
S02 Emissions (000 tons) 613 746 785 633 646 542 610
Heat Input (10^12 Btu) 3,953 3,860 4,060 3,698 3,638 3,422 3,383
Emission Rate (#/mmBtu) 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.36
Nameplate Capacity (MW) 185,787
Number of Units 1 501
Several of these units are not Phase II units.
Source: Pechan (1995)
Table 2. Aggregate unit data of our sample:
Mean Std. Dev Max Min Total
All Units (1043)
RTE85 (Ibs/mmBtu) 2.38 1.70 10.18 0.08
RTE93 (Ibs/mmBtu) 2.04 1.54 8.06 0.01
S02 85 (million tons) 15.34
SO2 93 (million tons) 14.10
Heat Input 85 (1015 Btu) 14.38
Heat Input 93 (1015 Btu) 15.75
Nameplate Capacity (GW) 305.7
Table A Units (251)
RTE85 4.30 1.38 10.18 2.50
RTE93 3.43 1.49 6.97 0.21
SO2 85 (million tons) 9.15
SO2 93 (million tons) 7.55
Heat Input 85 (1015 Btu) 4.28
Heat Input 93 (1015 Btu) 4.33
Nameplate Capacity (GW) 85.5
Non-Table A Units (792)t
RTE85 1.77 1.30 6.31 0.08
RTE93 1.60 1.27 8.06 0.01
SO2 85 (million tons) 6.19
SO2 93 (million tons) 6.55
Heat Input 85 (1015 Btu) 10.09
Heat Input 93 (1015 Btu) 11.42
Nameplate Capacity (GW) 220.2
There are 129 Non-Table A units with RTE85 2 2.5.
Source: Pechan (1995)
1993 and 1985
Table 3. Number of observations under each dummy variable
Table A Non-Table A Total
TA 251 0 251
D0_6 1 121 122
D6_8 16 101 117
D8_10 62 137 199
D10_12 67 135 202
D12_13 61 100 161
D13_ 44 198 242
STATELIM 12 49 61
SCRUB93 3 0 3
PHISCR 24 0 24
DATAERR 0 9 9
DIRTY 4 0 4
LCOAL 134 0 134
Table 4. OLS results of specification (l).t
RTE93 RTE92 RTE91 RTE90



















































































































































t t-statistics, which are shown in parenthesis, were calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent estimates for the
standard errors
tt t-statistics are calculated with Ho: P1=1
ttt No. of observations differ among years due to some non-Table units with zero S02 emissions.
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99% (for the Wald-tests, the critical values for 99% significance are 10.60 and
16.75 for Table A and Distance respectively)
Table 5. OLS results of alternative specifications.t
QUADRATIC LOG-LOG 2 2.5 CONTINUOUS NO DIRTY
#/mmBtu DISTANCE

























































































t t-statistics, which are shown in parenthesis, were calculated
standard errors
tt t-statistic is calculated with Ho: P1=1


























































































Table 6. S02 Emissions and Emissions Reduction.
(Million tons of S02)
ALL UNITS TABLE A NON-TABLE A
UNITS UNITS
EMISSIONS
Actual 1985 15.34 9.15 6.19
Actual 1993 14.10 7.55 6.55
Counterfactual 1993 16.12 9.28 6.83
Projected 1993 14.07 7.68 6.39
EMISSIONS REDUCTION
Actual 1985 to 1993 1.24 1.60 -0.36
Counterfactual 93 to Projected 93 2.05 1.61 0.44
DECOMPOSITION OF THE REDUCTION FROM THE COUNTERFACTUAL
Title IV Related Factors 0.39 0.23 0.16
Early Compliance 0.80 0.80 0.00
Other State Limits 0.22 0.05 0.16
Installing Scrubbers -0.06 -0.06 0.00
Clean Coal Technology 0.07 0.07 0.00
Local Coal Provisions -0.64 -0.64 0.00
Changing Sulfur Economics 1.66 1.37 0.28
0-600 miles 0.19 0.00 0.19
600-800 miles 0.61 0.23 0.38
800-1000 miles 0.66 0.50 0.16
1000-1200 miles 0.34 0.37 -0.03
1200-1300 miles -0.10 0.16 -0.27
> 1300 miles -0.04 0.11 -0.14
